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Abstract: The turbulent economic conditions that the European Monetary 
Union is facing, has created the need for an urgent change of the current fiscal policy 
of member states in the European Area. This research focuses on the use a Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE) that tries to analyse the policy 
effectiveness of two main innovations in fiscal integration. The first one is the 
introduction of the Eurobond and the second one is the creation of a European 
Unemployment Insurance. The first one is the introduction of the Eurobond and the 
second one is the creation of European Unemployment Insurance which will try to 
evaluate the welfare and business cycle effects of fiscal integration of the European 
Union. A New-Keynesian theory model could be estimated from the Euro Area due 
to the heterogeneity of the different countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of study 
The term fiscal union is subject to many different interpretations. According to 
Dabrowski (2015) are the “transfers of parts of fiscal resources and competences in 
the area of fiscal policy and fiscal management from the national to supranational 
level”. Fiscal integration is seriously considered especially after the great economic 
problems some periphery countries of the European Monetary Policy have faced. 
Countries such as Greece especially after 2010 faced serious debt problems which 
were not only restrained within the country. There was and still is a fear that the 
country’s government debt crisis can be transfer in the other European Monetary 
Union (EMU) countries’ banking crisis forming a vicious cycle in the Euro Area. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the study 
Many researches have been carried out regarding the benefits and costs of the 
creation of a fiscal union. The aim of this research was to model the countries of the 
Euro Area into two main groups (Core and Periphery) and run two different forms of 
"Science and Education" Scientific Journal April 2021 / Volume 2 Issue 4
www.openscience.uz 666
fiscal integration (Eurobond and Unemployment Insurance Scheme) in order to 
observe the reaction in the different economies.  
Many different conventional policies had been carried out since the start of the 
recent financial crisis but were not proven very useful. The conventional policy 
which lifted all the weight in the recent financial crisis was monetary policy. The 
slashing in interest rates was not very effective due to the weak response in the 
investment and consumption that is zero lower bound situations. Then, 
unconventional toolkit such as signalling, central bank balance sheet operations, 
quantitative easing and the macroprudential policies took place with very little effect.  
2. RESEARCH METHODOLODY 
2.1 Introduction 
Conventional policies are indeed no zero-sum game. This research tried to find 
the consequences in both the Core and Periphery major macroeconomic variables 
through impulse response functions (IRF) and analyse any spill over effects which 
could be arised. 
2.2 Research design 
A large – scale DSGE model will be built in order to test the effectiveness of 
fiscal integration and in particular the introduction and creation of a Eurobond as well 
as an unemployment insurance mechanism in the Euro Area. The model will be a two 
– region model and therefore Bayesian estimation would be used to calibrate the 
model. 
European Monetary Union (EMU) countries are very different therefore the 
contribution of this research would be the asymmetries in the calibration of the 
model. The model will be separated into the Core and the Periphery and therefore due 
to major differences in the two parts, different parameters could be used for a more 
realistic evaluation of the model. For calibration purposes data from the OECD 
database were used but also papers such as Pytlarczyk (2005) and Kolasa (2009) 
which can be advised as references. 
* 
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2.3 Data collection  
2.3.1 Fiscal integration  
The idea of fiscal integration was not only introduced due to the lack of policy 
toolkit we are now facing but from the very start of the EMU there was an opinion 
that a monetary union cannot live forever without common fiscal policy and 
stabilizers in place. Fiscal integration would aid in the risk sharing amongst member 
countries. 
Introduction of common debt insurance or any other form of fiscal integration is 
necessary for the EMU to survive (Van Rompuy (2012)). Van Rompuy was not the 
first to suggest risk sharing and fiscal integration. Prominent research in such field 
was carried out by MacDougall of the European Commission (1977) and Delors 
(1989). Names such as Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) argued 
in their work of Optimal Currency Area (OCA) ideas of state fiscal transfers. 
The reason researches are very optimistic when it comes to the discussion of 
fiscal integration is due to the results carried out during the analysis of the US 
economy. US can be considered as an OCA due to the same currency all states face, 
which is the dollar. Taking the example of the US, research was carried out in order 
to analyse the effect of a centralized fiscal authority in order to bring a balance in the 
different states after idiosyncratic shocks faced by the federation. 
According to Sala-i-Martin & Sachs (1992) approximately 40% of the initial 
effect of a shock to income is smoothed by the unified centralized taxes and transfers 
in the federation. Asdrubali et al.(1996) argue that fiscal transfers absorb almost 13% 
of a shock to GDP and therefore risk sharing among the states is achieved. Many 
studies have been taken for Canada, Germany, UK and Italy by Melitz & Zumer 
(1999), Antia et al. (1999) and Hepp & von Hagen (2013). However, results were not 
as optimistic regarding the Euro Area as suggested by Sorensen & Yosha (1998) and 
Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013). 
Bargain et al.(2012) tested the idea of an EU common tax and transfer system 
and the result was that a great majority of the countries would benefit from it and 
would indeed cause a risk sharing. However, the distributional effects of the overall 
macroeconomic stability were ambigious. Farhi & Werning (2012) used a DSGE 
mode to test the federal fiscal transfers. They showed that there is indeed a 
government role in providing insurance since cross countries risk sharing is very 
poor. Evers (2015) suggests that a common fiscal authority with a symmetric tax 
stabilizes output and consumption. However, this is very restrictive and does not 
apply to the heterogenous countries of the EMU. 
2.3.2 Eurobonds  
One way of fiscal integration is the issue of Eurobonds. Eurobonds would be 
something very similar to the US Treasury bonds. This idea was to put forward and 
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strongly be supported when evidence showed that the respective T-bills in the US 
reduced the US debt as suggested by S&P on 05/08/2011. US debt level was 
significantly reduced compared to the debt level existing in the EU. US assets are 
considered very safe despite the fact that the debt of the US is larger than the 
aggregate euro area debt itself. 
Eurobonds would increase the credibility in borrowing and is a form of bringing 
risk together. Moreover, there would be an increase in liquidity. Eurobonds would be 
the main rival of T-bills and it could attract creditor countries of US such as China to 
diverse their portfolios by investing in Eurobonds as well. It would be a centralized 
but within Euro Area mechanism of adjusting the instabilities in the Euro Area. 
However, Eurobonds should be constructed in a very cautions way to prevent free 
riding and moral hazard (de Grauwe and Moesen, 2009, and Kösters, 2009). One way 
to reduce the moral hazard issue is the proposal of blue and red bonds as suggested 
by Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2011). Blue bonds include issue of debt up to 60% of 
GDP of a country which would be guaranteed by all euro members while any country 
willing to borrow more would issue red bonds and would be sorely liable for the extra 
debt (no risk sharing any more). 
2.3.3 European unemployment insurance scheme  
The European unemployment insurance scheme aims to distribute transfers of 
short term unemployment benefits to EU citizens who are in need. The person who 
argued firstly about this approach was Dullien (2007 and 2013). Dullien suggested 
that the system of benefits would last only for a year and benefits would be decided 
on payroll taxes or corporate tax. Dolls et al. (2014) examines the macroeconomic 
effects of an unemployment benefit scheme over the period 2000-13. They found that 
such a system would partly replace national unemployment systems and would have 
helped smooth 36% of the unemployment shock in 2009, at a contribution rate of 
1.6% of employment income. Things to be taken into consideration when 
constructing the optimal unemployment insurance scheme is the heterogeneity of the 
different countries, unemployment patterns and the rigidity in each countries labour 
market. 
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Nominal rigidities would be included, Calvo pricing, a unified monetary policy, 
capital adjustment costs, wage setting but also different versions of unemployment 
insurance schemes and Eurobond to check which one produces the best results in the 
model. 
The model would follow mostly the same approach as other DSGE models as 
presented by Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995), Christiano et al. (2005), Smets & Wouters 
(2003) and Gali & Monacelli (2008). The only difference here would be the induced 
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heterogeneity of the countries within the currency union as presented in Pytlarczyk 
(2005) and Kolasa (2009). 
In this model, we have the Core and the Periphery and they are part of a 
monetary union. They have the same currency, the Euro, and there is the ECB which 
controls the monetary policy – centralised monetary policy. Since the members are 
trading mostly and heavily among themselves (reason the EMU and EEC was firstly 
established) trading with the outside world can be omitted. However, at the very end 
an open with the rest of the world trade can be added due to the rising Asian market 
to check as a robust check if our results are altered. 
In the core and the periphery respectively we have households, firms and 
government. Households in the two different regions are allowed to have different 
preferences. Households provide their specialised labour – monopolistic competition- 
and rent capital to both the domestic market but also the foreign (core or periphery) 
market. The households are consuming both their goods and the foreign ones. Firms 
produce tradable and non-tradeable goods. Any prices in the model are determined a 
la Calvo pricing. We are allowing migration in the union as it captures the reality of 
the EMU. Transaction costs do not exist. The ECB imposes the monetary policies and 
national governments in every region collect taxation from their households to fund 
their expenditure. Households and firms are all of measure one – infinitely many but 
still heterogenous so monopolistic competition mechanism is induced. Regarding the 
unemployment insurance scheme a fund is created and is common in the whole 
union. Unemployment benefits are money coming from the core countries and 
transferred to the peripheries to support periphery households in need. Therefore, it 
works as a lump sum tax and transfer between the two regions. Thus money is 
transferred from one regions “Core” budget constraint to the “Periphery” budget 
constraint. 
However, this would affect not only the budge constraint but later the wage 
setting and price setting. The spill over effects of such a policy would be analysed 
since the reduction of the unemployment would have an overall boost in the 
economic condition of the EMU as a whole and not only in the country or group of 
countries in need. The utility function can be enhanced by introducing a variable that 
increases utility by obtaining unemployment benefits. Different versions of the 
unemployment insurance scheme can be introduced (e.g. one with no punishment to 
the periphery countries if its households receiving benefits from the scheme and/or 
one with punishment). The Eurobond would work as a unified asset market within the 
system allowing for absorption of any shocks arising. 
4. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The EMU (European Monetary Union) does not have any fiscal instrument in 
place in order to absorb any shocks occurring preventing heavy turbulences in 
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macroeconomic variables. (EMU) cannot live for long without a European Fiscal 
Union (EFU). However, it should be done in a way to reduce any free riding effects, 
e.g. countries such as Greece taking advantage of the financial safety provided by the 
other more financially stable countries and preventing the effect of having some 
countries being pure contributors to the whole system or having to pay higher interest 
rates due to the financial constraints of other union members. 
The first simulation of the Euro Area would just be a replication of the current 
reality of having a centralised monetary policy but many different fiscal regional 
policies. Such a model would be run and observe the effects a shock – financial 
shock, e.g. house bubble as in the US or banking or government debt crisis, has on 
the main macroeconomics variables. 
Once setting up the benchmark model then enhancements of the model would be 
created and compared with this. The introduction of the two new fiscal integration 
policies would be introduced and any alternations of them to find their “perfect” 
form. Moreover, the assumptions of the model could be relaxed such as trade with the 
rest of the world, heterogeneity even between the within core/ periphery countries.  
To conclude, long run effects, dynamics, welfare and spill over effects would be 
analysed. The model used would be Matlab preferably since it is the one which 
allows you to check the code in detail and does not follow an automatic pattern. At a 
first state VAR estimation maybe carried out to see the results from a more simplified 
model in order to have a prior idea of what kind of results it would be expected. 
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